Debriefing | The Contracting Education Academy

May 22, 2018 By cs

DoD implements FY18 NDAA requirement for post-debriefing Q&A process

This past March marked the beginning of a more fulsome required debriefing process for defense contracts.

The Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP) issued a class deviation memorandum, effective March 22, 2008, requiring contracting officers to: (1) provide unsuccessful offerors an opportunity to submit additional questions within two days after receiving a debriefing; and (2) hold the debriefing open until the agency delivers written responses. The class deviation implements Section 818 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (NDAA).

Federal agencies have long been required to debrief unsuccessful bidders after it awards a contract on the “basis of a competitive proposals.” And the existing FAR provisions applicable to such debriefings, FAR 15.505 and 15.506, already require agencies to include, as part of the debriefing process, “reasonable responses to relevant questions about whether source selection procedures were followed . . . .”

In practice, however, agencies regularly ignore that requirement — often providing a limited written debriefing, declaring the debriefing closed with no opportunity for questions, and thereby putting the disappointed offeror on a 5-day clock to protest, without all the information to which it is entitled.

Keep reading this article at: https://www.insidegovernmentcontracts.com/2018/05/questions-department-defense-implements-fy-2018-ndaa-requirement-post-debriefing-qa-process/

September 25, 2017 By cs

Senate passes $700 billion 2018 NDAA, including procurement reforms

On September 18, 2017 the Senate passed its version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018.

The Senate version of the NDAA authorizes defense spending at close to $700 billion for Fiscal Year 2018, which begins on October 1. The Senate NDAA’s $700 billion total is more than President Donald Trump requested, and also exceeds the caps set by the Budget Control Act of 2011. In order to provide the authorized $700 billion level through appropriation bills, Congress will need to address the limits of the Budget Control Act and eliminate the threat of sequestration.

As is the case each year, the NDAA will include significant procurement reform provisions. Although it remains to be seen which of these provisions will be included in the final version of the NDAA passed by Congress and signed into law by the president, the Senate and House versions both contain notable reforms that would impact the laws and regulations applicable to government contractors. For example, the Senate version contains reforms to the debriefing and bid protest process and the House version would permit and promote Department of Defense (DoD) purchases through online commercial marketplaces. Both versions contain significant potential reforms to the regulation of commercial items.

In its recent vote, the Senate was acting on H.R. 2810, the House version of the 2018 NDAA, and voted on Amendment #1003, which included the Senate version of the NDAA. This version was further modified by numerous bipartisan amendments, including an amendment that incorporated the Modernizing Government Technology (MGT) Act. The MGT provisions would establish information technology working capital funds at 24 federal agencies and set up a separate $500 million modernization fund within the Department of the Treasury, to be administered by the General Services Administration, for the purpose of improving information technology and cybersecurity across the federal government.

Below is a summary of several significant procurement reform provisions in the Senate and House versions of the NDAA, each of which contain more than 50 separate sections related to procurement policies and reform.

Keep reading this article at: https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=6e11bc94-e1ca-42a7-ae21-b96f2965ad02

August 16, 2017 By cs

Senate attempt to reduce protests misses the point

When it comes to federal procurement, the frequency and expectation of protests has had a palpable, costly, and sometimes deleterious effect on the process and those competing in it.

Most companies now add an extra six to 12 months to their revenue projections in order to account for possible protests.

There is good reason to believe (including surveys) that “low price/technically acceptable” (LPTA) procurement strategies are, with some frequency, driven by a desire to avoid protests, since protesting such procurements is near impossible.

And, of course, there have been cases where incumbents, having lost a re-competition, submit a protest and, as a result, effectively get a contract extension while the protest is decided.

All of these represent unintended and undesirable impacts of the protest process. As a result, many have believed for some time that significant remedial action is needed. This includes the Senate Armed Services Committee, which, for the second year in a row, has included provisions in the defense authorization bill that would require losing protestors to reimburse the government for the costs of a protest when none of the plaintiff’s allegations are sustained.

Keep reading this article at: https://washingtontechnology.com/articles/2017/07/25/insights-soloway-bid-protests.aspx

January 11, 2017 By cs

Why procurement officials shouldn’t fear debriefings

The White House has a strong message for the government’s buying officials: Talk to the companies that bid on a contract about why they did or didn’t win the award.

The Office of Management and Budget’s Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) recently released a “myth-buster” memo clearing up misconceptions about debriefing meetings, the post-award discussions often requested by unsuccessful vendors curious about why they weren’t selected.

Among common practices OFPP tried to bust: “If a company brings a lawyer, cut the discussion short.”

Keep reading this article at: http://www.nextgov.com/cio-briefing/2017/01/why-procurement-officials-shouldnt-fear-debriefings/134375

Read the OFPP’s Jan. 5, 2017 “myth busting” memo at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/procurement/memo/myth-busting_3_further_improving_industry_communications_with_effectiv….pdf

May 5, 2016 By cs

Common feedback to unsuccessful bidders

The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) allows several opportunities for the government to provide feedback to bidders during or after competitions. The post-award debriefing of offerors is one of those opportunities, and can be a very valuable tool for companies seeking feedback on their proposals.

The government is required by the FAR to provide a post-award debriefing to any offeror who requests one in writing within 3 days of notification of contract award.

In the dozens of competition debriefs I’ve conducted or attended in more than a decade, I’m consistently surprised by how often we repeat the same information. The following reviews the format we use for debriefings, questions we’re frequently asked during the discussions, and some of the common feedback we seem to repeat regularly.

The Department of Defense (DoD) guidance on debriefings states the objective as: “The crux of any post award debriefing is the SSA [Source Selection Authority] award decision and whether that decision is well supported and resulted from a source selection conducted in a thorough, fair and sound manner consistent with the requirements and source-selection methodology established in the RFP [request for proposal].” The preceding quote (under section B.8.3.1) and other information about DoD source selections can be found on DAU’s Acquisition Community Connection at: https://acc.dau.mil/dodssp.

First, our standard debriefing format: The objective of this post-award debriefing is to highlight the significant elements in your proposal and to summarize the rationale for award. The ground rules are open and honest discussions within the limits of FAR 15.506.

The focus is on your proposal submission. But overall evaluated cost, task order management and technical proposal ranking for the successful bidder will be provided, including summary of the rationale for award.

Reasonable responses will be given to relevant questions about whether the source-selection procedures, applicable regulations and other applicable authorities were followed in eliminating your proposal from the competition.

You are encouraged to ask questions. Answers not provided today will be provided in writing as soon as possible. In accordance with the FAR 15.506(e), the government will not disclose:

• Trade secrets

• Privileged or confidential processes and techniques

• Commercial and financial information that is privileged or confidential

• Names of individuals providing reference information on past performance

Source Selection Process/Evaluation Factors

In this section, we read a summary of the source-selection process outlined in Sections L and M of the RFP, including the rating scheme and prioritization of factors evaluated. An example is shown below:

A color-code rating technique was used to evaluate the Management and Technical proposals. Past Performance was evaluated for an overall confidence rating and cost proposals were not given a rating. Each proposal was evaluated against the following four factors: (1) Management, (2) Technical Proposal, (3) Past Performance, and (4) Cost. Evaluation of Factors 1 and 2 focused on the strengths, weaknesses, significant weaknesses and deficiencies of the proposals. Evaluation of risk associated with the proposals for these factors are inherent in the evaluation.

As outlined within the RFP, Management and Technical are equal in importance and more important than Past Performance. When combined, these three are significantly more important than Cost.

Following the reading of our standard debriefing, we review the ratings the company in question received. In particular, we focus on the “strengths, weaknesses, significant weaknesses, and deficiencies of the proposal” that resulted in the final overall rating.

Some Common Questions and Answers

Q: Can you tell us how we might compete more favorably next time?

A: Our response to this generally is fairly standard, and tracks directly back to what we tell you in Sections L (Instructions, conditions, and notices to offerors or respondents) and M (Evaluation factors for award). First, your proposal should show that you understand the requirement, preferably without regurgitating it. Second, your proposal should demonstrate how you are going to meet the requirement. Last, but certainly not least, the higher color ratings are awarded when the proposal (1) meets requirements; (2) shows a thorough (or exceptional) approach and understanding of the requirements; (3) contains strengths which outweigh (or far outweigh) any weaknesses; (4) and when risk—not evaluated separately—of unsuccessful performance is low or very low.

Q: Why wasn’t our “concept X” evaluated as a strength?

A: The DoD source-selection procedures (https://acc.dau. mil/dodssp) define a strength as “an aspect of an offeror’s proposal that has merit or exceeds specified performance or capability requirements in a way that will be advantageous to the government during contract performance.” It is incumbent on the vendors to demonstrate their understanding of the requirement, and explain how their approaches will provide value to the government. In many cases, good ideas do not rise to the level of a strength in evaluation because: (1) the concept expressed in the proposal does provide value to the government but is part of what was asked for in the RFP (i.e., is part of how you will meet our requirements, not a way to meet them better, smarter, faster, etc.); or (2) the concept isn’t supported by or integrated with the rest of the proposal (does not track to pricing, is not supported by staffing, is not integrated with service-delivery model, etc.). For example, nearly all proposals we review include ideas such as reach-back support, a council of graybeards to provide strategic consultation, or something else intended to differentiate the proposal from others. But, without providing details on the specific, tangible outcomes (in terms of hours, work products or deliverables) that meet the definition of strength, the government will not evaluate them as strengths during a source selection.

Q: Why were we evaluated with a weakness for “Y?”

A: In general, we would prefer that it never come to this. Our intent is to have significant and substantive discussions throughout our acquisitions to the broadest extent authorized. As a result of those discussions, we should at the very least have communicated to the vendors any significant deficiencies or weaknesses in their proposals and given them time to correct those deficiencies. The presence of a weakness in the final evaluation generally means (1) we don’t believe the vendor understands or recognizes the weakness we’ve pointed out and hasn’t changed its proposal to respond to it; or (2) despite the vendor’s attempt(s) to respond to the weakness, we still don’t understand how the vendor plans to address it or don’t see the staffing or other resources to resolve the matter.

Q: Wasn’t this just a Lowest Priced, Technically Acceptable (LPTA) source selection?

A: There is a time and place for LPTA, but the RFP will always state specifically where the evaluation falls on the best value continuum. The vast majority of our source selections are conducted as best value trade-offs. From the top down in Special Operations Research, Development and Acquisition, we’re strong believers in best value source selections and actively strive to be the best in DoD at conducting them. We focus a great deal of time and effort to ensure we have a well-trained and prepared acquisition workforce with the experience and tools to properly execute, document and communicate the source selections we make and to defend the selections in the event of any protests.

Q: Can you tell us how our cost or proposal compared with the other offerors?

A: Unfortunately, no. In most cases, we will provide the winning offeror’s total cost, and the winner’s evaluation results in terms of colors. We are prohibited by the FAR from disclosing any proprietary information (including other offerors’ costs), directly comparing vendors or providing point-bypoint comparisons.

Some Common Feedback

The evaluation team felt you spent too much of your proposal regurgitating the requirement to us. It’s sometimes a fine balance, but you need to convey to us that you understand the requirement without just reading it back to us. In addition, including examples of work on past efforts does not demonstrate your understanding of the requirement. That experience is evaluated as part of past performance.

Your pricing, staffing model or overall approach (or portions of them) did not make sense to us, were not well supported or didn’t track back clearly to your understanding of the requirement. When evaluating your proposal, we take a very structured approach. We read to understand your overall approach and understanding of the requirement, evaluate whether your proposal meets our requirements, and then identify any strengths or weaknesses of your approach. Well-written proposals lead us clearly and unambiguously through that process and are consistent throughout. An example of this is dividing a large proposal into sections by different vendor offices or organizations. This can save time by having the subject-matter expert write each proposal area, but frequently results in a disjointed proposal when the different sections are not well integrated. We recommend a detailed final review by the offeror of the entire proposal to ensure it is clear and consistent and that the data are not repeated in multiple sections.

Evaluation of past performance is based on the offeror’s recent/relevant performance record from a variety of sources. This may include information provided by the offeror, information obtained from questionnaires (internally or externally), or information obtained from any other source available to the government (Past Performance Information Retrieval System, electronic Subcontract Reporting System, etc.).

So, that’s a quick down and dirty overview of the format we use for debriefings of unsuccessful offerors, questions we’re frequently asked during the discussions, and some of the common feedback we seem to repeat regularly. Hopefully, it provides some insight into the thought patterns and work processes of the evaluation team and background for your next source selection.

The author can be contacted at anthony.davis@socom.mil.

See the full Mar.-Apr. 2016 issue of Defense AT&L magazine at: http://dau.dodlive.mil/files/2016/02/DATL-Mar_Apr_2016.pdf