Unallowable Costs | The Contracting Education Academy

July 20, 2017 By cs

ASBCA throws DCAA another brushback pitch

In an April 2017 decision, the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) once again rejected the position of the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) that a cost or type of cost for which allowability depends on the circumstances or Contracting Officer discretion can nonetheless be “expressly unallowable” and subject to penalties under FAR 42.709-1(a).

Although the law is clear that penalties are appropriate only when such costs are named and stated to be unallowable in a cost principle such that a counter position is unreasonable, the DCAA has continued to assert its erroneous position in its audit guidance and findings.

A contractor is subject to penalties if it includes in its indirect cost submission an indirect cost that is “expressly unallowable under a cost principle in the FAR, or an executive agency supplement to the FAR.” FAR 42.709-1(a)(1).

The ASBCA has explained the standard for whether a cost is expressly unallowable is “objective.” General Dynamics Corp., ASBCA No. 49732, 02-2 BCA ¶ 31,888, reversed on other grounds, Rumsfeld v. General Dynamics Corp., 365 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2004). An item of cost is expressly unallowable if it is “specifically named and stated as unallowable….” Raytheon Company, ASBCA Nos. 57576, 57679, 58290, June 26, 2015. Moreover, “the Government must show that it was unreasonable under all the circumstances for a person in the contractor’s position to conclude that the costs were allowable.” General Dynamics Corp.

In twin Memoranda for Regional Directors (MRDs) dated December 18, 2014 and January 7, 2015, the DCAA provided its audit teams with guidance concerning the identification of expressly unallowable costs that contradicted these clear rules. 14-PAC-021(R); 14-PAC-022(R). Relying on an ASBCA case from the 1980s, Emerson Electric Co., ASBCA No. 30090, 87-1 BCA ¶ 19,478, November 19, 1986, the DCAA opined that “a cost can be unallowable even though the cost principle does not explicitly state that the cost is unallowable or not allowable.” 14-PAC-022(R). “[I]n situations where a cost principle does not specifically state that the applicable cost is unallowable or not allowable, the audit team will have to employ critical thinking when determining whether the cost principle identifies expressly unallowable costs” and “whether the cost principle identifies a cost or type of cost clearly enough that there cannot be a reasonable difference of opinion as to whether a questioned cost meets the criteria specified.” Id.

Keep reading this article at: http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=601112

July 17, 2017 By cs

ASBCA issues important ruling in ‘contractor-on-the-battlefield’ dispute

Last month, the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) held that the U.S. Army breached its contractual obligation to provide physical security to its principal logistical support contractor, KBR, during the height of the Iraq War.

As a consequence, the Board found that KBR was entitled to be reimbursed for $44 million, plus interest, in costs that the Government had withheld from KBR relating to KBR’s and its subcontractors’ use of private security. A copy of the opinion is available here.

Before the Board, the Army had argued that the costs in question were unallowable because KBR’s LOGCAP III contract with the Government prohibited the use of private security. In response, KBR argued (among other things) that any violation of this prohibition had been excused by the Government’s prior material breach of its obligation to provide physical security. On the basis of an extensive documentary and testimonial record (including a month-long trial), the Board agreed with KBR, finding:

[D]espite the many and continuing failures of the government to provide the promised level of force protection to KBRS and its subcontractors . . . , the government seeks to disallow the PSC costs incurred . . . in order to accomplish [the] mission under the LOGCAP contract despite the government’s breach, and argues that its breach was not material. It is hard to imagine a contract breach more material than this one, which eviscerated the promise at the heart of the justification for the government’s claim.

Keep reading this article at: https://www.insidegovernmentcontracts.com/2017/06/asbca-issues-important-ruling-contractor-battlefield-dispute/

October 27, 2016 By cs

Whistleblower alleges culture of intimidation at DCAA

J. Kirk McGill was a Senior Auditor at the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA), the agency responsible for auditing the Department of Defense’s (DoD) contract expenditures. He is also a whistleblower whose disclosures to Congress have resulted in multiple Congressional hearings, the termination of a nonprofit from grants worth over $400 million, and the closure of a loophole in contracting policy for nonprofit grantees.

Importantly, his case also sets a precedent for federal whistleblowers to engage in whistleblowing activities while on official time. None of this was easy, and it came—as is too often the case for whistleblowers—at a personal cost to McGill.

In 2013, McGill and his DCAA team were loaned out to the National Science Foundation’s (NSF) Inspector General (IG) to conduct a follow-up audit of the $433 million construction grant NSF had awarded for a project called the National Ecological Observatory Network (NEON). The project was not competitively bid, and despite an earlier DCAA audit finding serious problems with the initial proposal, NSF awarded it to a nonprofit organization called NEON, Inc.—a nonprofit focused solely on the project.

McGill, who was the Auditor-in-Charge, and his team found that NEON, Inc.’s accounting system was seriously flawed and lacked important supporting documentation. The audit also found poor budget controls that meant the project managers wouldn’t know if the program ran over budget—even tens of millions of dollars over budget—until it was too late to prevent. (The NSF later admitted that the project had run $80 million over budget.) As concerning as those numbers are, the audit also found that NEON, Inc. was abusing a $1.8 million category of funds called “management fees,” which were being used to pay for unallowable costs like alcohol, lobbying, and a lavish holiday party. McGill reported two instances of suspected fraud to the NSF IG through the normal channels. The IG investigated and referred the cases to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for potential prosecution, but DOJ declined to pursue them [p.3].

When McGill examined the requirements of reporting suspected fraud in an audit report, he found himself trapped.

Keep reading this article at: http://www.pogo.org/blog/2016/10/whistleblower-alleges-culture-of-intimidation-at-dcaa.html

December 24, 2014 By cs

Adjustments in agency cost realism analyses must be rational

Editor’s note: This is the second post in a series focused on protest allegations related to cost and price analyses. The first post explained the basic principles on price and cost realism. Planned future posts will discuss benchmarks an agency may use in a realism analysis, the role of an offeror’s technical approach in a price/cost realism analysis, price reasonableness, and recent protest decisions involving cost/price analysis issues.

As discussed in the first post in this series, a cost realism analysis is required when an agency evaluates proposals for a cost-reimbursement contract. The analysis is required for cost-reimbursement contracts because under these contracts, an offeror’s proposed costs are not controlling–the Government will be bound to pay the contractor its actual, allowable, and reasonable costs. To determine the probable cost of performance, an agency may adjust the amounts an offeror proposed for given elements to reflect what the agency believes is realistic – the most probable cost. When an agency adjusts an offeror’s proposed amount and the offeror is not selected for award, those adjustments can become a ground for protest at GAO or the CFC.

Cost realism analyses are a standard part of an evaluation for the award of a cost-reimbursement contract. When an agency does a cost realism analysis, it reviews and evaluates specific elements of an offeror’s proposed cost estimates to determine whether the proposed costs (1) are realistic for the work to be performed, (2) reflect an understanding of the requirements, and (3) are consistent with the method of performance described in the offeror’s technical approach. If the proposed costs are inconsistent with these principles, the agency will make adjustments to determine the probable cost of performance.

Keep reading this article at: http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=360474

June 6, 2014 By cs

Army to Seek Northrop refunds over inflated labor rates

The U.S. Army will press Northrop Grumman Corp. (NOC) for refunds after the Pentagon’s inspector general found the contractor charged the service inflated labor rates on programs to fight drug trafficking.

The Army Contracting Command will conduct its own audit “as soon as feasible” of Northrop’s billings and the resumes of subcontractor workers to determine how much money should be repaid, spokeswoman Giselle Lyons said in an e-mail.

Allegations in the report “are being further investigated by the U.S. Army Contracting Command,” she said. “The command is implementing the recommendations proposed to help ensure the proper management and oversight of current and future contract actions.”

Northrop, the fifth-biggest U.S. contractor, charged the Army excessive labor rates for almost six years for more than 300 subcontractor employees working in Afghanistan and in the U.S. on counter-narcotics efforts abroad, the inspector general said in a May 13 report labeled “For Official Use Only” and obtained by Bloomberg News.

Keep reading this article at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-05-29/army-to-seek-northrop-refunds-over-inflated-labor-rates.html

Last month, the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) held that the U.S. Army breached its contractual obligation to provide physical security to its principal logistical support contractor, KBR, during the height of the Iraq War.

Search this Website